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target al Qaeda's leaders, who provide the inspiration and direction for the global jihad. As long as they are alive and active, they will symbolize successful resistance to the United States and continue to attract new recruits. The death of bin Laden and his senior associates in Pakistan … would not end the movement, but it would deal al Qaeda a serious blow. Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community to develop plans to close terrorist safe havens. 5 A year later, the 9/11 Commission Report detailed the "direct and indirect value of the Afghan sanctuary to al Qaeda in preparing the 9/11 attack." As a result, the Commission concluded, "The US government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy to keep possible terrorist insecure and on the run, using all elements of national power." will bear the finger prints of al Qaeda." 9 The Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee this March that, "al-Qa'ida's core organization in the tribal areas of Pakistan is…the most dangerous component of the larger alQa'ida network." 10 There is near-universal agreement amongst senior US officials that the FATA sanctuary poses a central challenge to winning the war against al Qaeda and its affiliates. 13 The report said these states are marked by "weak security, fractured societal relations, corruption, breakdown in the rule of law, lack of mechanisms for generating legitimate power." 14 It is here that terrorists seek refuge.
Safe Haven
The Ungoverned Territories study conducted by RAND for the US Air Force in 2007 and the aforementioned OUSDP study provide a detailed analysis of the factors that enable safe havens. They can be broadly characterized as: 1) adequate infrastructure, 2) hospitability, and 3) poor governance. Terrorist organizations require some basic infrastructure to support their operations. This includes communications capabilities, a transportation system, weapons availability, access to personnel, and sources of income. A safe haven must also provide a hospitable environment for the illicit actors. This typically includes cultural, religious, or ethnic affinities with the "guests", a set of shared grievances, and the existence of ongoing conflict or violence to help set the stage. Lastly, a good safe haven is marked by poor governance. This includes limited penetration by the government into the society, a lack of monopoly of force, and a lack of political will to extend government control over the region. Taken together, these characteristics define current and potential areas around the globe that are conducive to providing safe haven. The RAND study analyzed eight potential safe havens and found the Pakistani-Afghan border region to be the "prototypical ungoverned territory." 15 The remainder of this paper explores how al Qaeda has turned it into a thriving safe haven. 44 They have assumed near-total administration of the FATA, controlling transportation, taxes, the justice system, and disbursement of government monies. 45 They have instituted their infamous edicts: closing girls' schools, banning women from public sight, barring entertainment, and beating barbers. 46 The Pakistani Taliban In fact, the bond between Pakistan and the Taliban was so strong that 9/11 and US operations in Afghanistan would not sever it. The ISI continued to supply the Taliban after 9/11.
An estimated 9,000 Pakistani fighters flowed into Afghanistan to fight against the United States and the Northern Alliance. 52 After their rout in Afghanistan, the Taliban were welcomed back to
Pakistan where the ISI reportedly ran Taliban training camps and facilities, facilitated arms shipments from various Gulf countries, provided supplies and equipment, transported fighters into Afghanistan, supported them with ground artillery, and passed intelligence for safe passage. 53 To hide its operations from the CIA, the ISI established covert offices in Peshawar and Quetta, disguised as legitimate non-governmental organizations, to maintain their clandestine links with the Taliban. 54 One Talibani Kabul, set up consulates throughout Afghanistan, and began supplying extensive aid to the new government. These moves greatly concerned the Pakistani government who fear Indian influence in Afghanistan after the US leaves. 56 Maintaining the Taliban intact offers a check against Indian meddling. After 9/11, Pakistan hoped to differentiate between al Qaeda on one hand and the Taliban and its militant proxies in Kashmir on the other. Like the Taliban, the Kashmiri militant groups LET and JEM were a strategic hedge against India. With ISI support, the Kashmiri militants effectively tied down some 100,000 Indian troops dispatched to control the insurgency in Kashmir. 57 Pakistan could not afford to lose two of its best tools in its fight with India. However, the ISI is losing control of its proxy, "Now the militants are autonomous.
No one can control them anymore." 58 Pakistan immediately agreed to all of the US demands, in what would become known as a "first say yes, then say but…" policy. 60 Yet, Pakistani help would prove crucial to OEF. More than a thousand US personnel were based in or staged through Pakistan, including search and rescue units, civil engineering units, Special Forces, and CIA teams. The United States flew 57,800
sorties from Pakistan and used the Karachi seaport extensively. 61 Beyond support to OEF, Pakistan also helped make a dent in the al Qaeda leadership structure. Former CIA Director Michael Hayden points out, "We have killed or captured more members of al Qaeda, more of the al Qaeda senior leadership in partnership with our Pakistani allies than we have with any other partner around the world." 62 Pakistan deployed federal troops to the FATA for the first time in its history after 9/11 ostensibly to close the border during OEF. 67 The deployment was cut short in January 2002 as 60,000 troops were pulled from the Afghan border and sent to the Indian border after a series of insurgent attacks in Kashmir escalated tensions between Pakistan and India. 68 Waziristan. 73 The Pakistani government responded with more negotiations. Various tribal leaders "surrendered" to authorities only to be released and paid for promises of future cooperation which never materialized. US foreign assistance budget goes to Pakistan. 93 The GAO reported that nearly half of all funds were spent on the tribal areas. 18 percent went toward the purchase of weapons systems designed to fight India (F-16s, anti-ship missiles, and antimissile defenses). 94 A mere one percent was spent on development assistance for the FATA. 95 Recognizing this imbalance, the United States agreed to spend an additional $750 million to support the Pakistani government's FATA Sustainable Development Plan. USAID will match Pakistani investments in development, security, infrastructure, and public diplomacy through 2012. 96 They are also directing a $300 million "cash for work" initiative to combat chronic unemployment.
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SECTION THREE: OPTIONS FOR US STRATEGY
The following section examines three options for confronting al Qaeda's safe haven in Pakistan. Option 1 explores an Air Policing strategy similar to British colonial Air Control.
Option 2 reviews the transferability of the Al Anbar Awakening movement to Pakistan's tribes.
Option 3 considers a counterinsurgency strategy similar to recent operations in the Philippines. conventional operations in COIN to that of a "fly swatter." 132 That is because insurgents generally do not attempt to hold specific territory, they replace loses quickly, and their superior mobility complicates successful targeting by the counterinsurgent. 133 Consequently, killing the insurgent is not the ultimate objective, but rather winning the support of the local populace.
Galula suggests that victory requires "permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population." 134 Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The 1,300 US personnel were limited by the Philippine constitution to a strictly advisory role. They were prohibited from participating in combat operations and were authorized to use force only in self-defense. 135 The main thrust of the action centered on the island of Basilan which was home base for the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a 1,000-man strong terrorist organization with links to al Qaeda. By 2002, the AFP had ceded much of the island to the ASG. Most of the teachers, doctors, and other professionals had fled.
No non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had operated there since 1999. 136 In preparation for the deployment, a two-man US civil affairs team scouted the island interviewing as many of Basilan's 300,000 inhabitants as possible. 137 The survey was designed to "build a map of disenfranchisement to ascertain where active and passive support would likely blossom." 138 The team discovered that the ASG was strongest in the mostly-Muslim southern part of the island where the government was weakest. They also found the islanders desperately needed clean water, medical care, and transportation infrastructure. 139 160 Special Forces (SF) personnel were dispatched into the ASG strongholds. They first bolstered defenses at AFP base camps, and then focused on training the junior officer and noncommissioned officer corps. The training was designed to instill confidence and increase unit proficiency by improving decision-making, command and control, combat lifesaving, and response to dynamic intelligence. 140 A dramatic increase in AFP patrolling reduced ASG operating space and created an expanding security zone. 141 The US role also extended to advising and assisting Filipino commandos during their raids. The improving security enabled the deployment of 300 Naval Construction Task Group (NCTG) personnel. During their 60-day mission, the NCTG constructed a C-130 capable runway, eight helicopter landing zones, 80
kilometers of roads, four bridges, a pier, and three deepwater wells. In addition, SF medical personnel ran free clinics across the island, treating as many as 1,000 patients a day. 142 The US Agency for International Development also invested heavily in Basilan, building a dam, waterfiltration plant, and school. 143 Through it all, the United States stayed as far in the background as "delivering $150 million in aid to the tribal areas could very quickly make a few people rich and do almost nothing to provide opportunity and justice to the region." The report's author said, "The insecurity of the area will require a heavy reliance on local partners. But the nongovernmental organizations don't trust the military, the military doesn't trust the tribal chiefs, and the tribal chiefs won't trust us unless they're getting a cut of the money." 147 Getting the aid into the right hands will be problematic. The Taliban has decimated the tribal structure. There are few friendly tribal leaders and no NGOs able to implement the development programs.
Many fear that an infusion of funds would only benefit the Taliban leadership and help them consolidate gains.
Offering an important caution, William McCallister, who most recently served as an advisor to the US Marines in Iraq, makes a compelling case against any expansive development and political reform agenda for the FATA, bluntly stating, "We are not going to win hearts or change minds." Writing in the Small Wars Journal, he highlighted the "risk of engaging an opponent whose strategic calculus differs so markedly from our own." He warned against any attempt to alter the deep-rooted cultural and societal norms of the tribal system: "Western notions of legitimacy and good governance are unlikely to resonate with individual tribesmen since they do not share our cultural heritage and appreciation for the implied wisdom these concepts embody." 148 Thus, any strategy must be culturally appropriate and self-sustaining.
SECTION FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS
There will be no easy victory in Pakistan. The United States and its allies have been in
Afghanistan for eight years with a heavy investment in troops and development; yet, the Taliban remain resilient. Most of the gains are reversible. "Winning" in Pakistan will take a long time, a large commitment, and a heavy dose of patience. The status quo is not sufficient. Al Qaeda continues to operate with impunity; Bin Laden and Zawahiri continue to "plan high impact plots" from the FATA. 149 There are too many negative trends to simply muddle through. None of the previously described approaches alone will lead to victory. What is needed is a hybrid approach.
The following considerations should guide the strategy. Ultimately, the United States cannot succeed in the FATA without the full support of the government of Pakistan. Clearly, the Pakistanis must do more to prove they are reliable partners.
To that end, all future US aid to the government in Islamabad, especially high-end equipment better suited for war with India, must be contingent on Pakistan's taking concrete steps to eliminate al Qaeda's sanctuary in the FATA. Pakistan must allow the deployment of a small US contingent to enable more effective military operations. This force could be limited to a trainand-advise role similar to that in OEF-P. This certainly is not the Clear-Hold-Build strategy of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Pakistan must take the lead. The fragility of the elected government in Islamabad and the significant anti-American sentiment will require a nuanced approach. US operations in and with Pakistan cannot destabilize the nuclear armed country.
The United States should also seek to exploit cleavages between the various parties.
William McCallister suggests that the "formation of factions within the tribe is a leader's greatest threat." To that end, he suggests the United States work to "divide and isolate the tribe from its existing societal network in order to destroy the elite group of dedicated, hard-core fighters that form the vanguard of the embedded Islamist movement." 152 The United States and Pakistan must reinforce local tribes that stand up to the Taliban. We should move to bolster the nascent movements as quickly as the Taliban has been to counter them. They are our allies. We cannot afford to lose them to the Taliban. The United States and Pakistan should also exploit the divergent goals and ethnic composition of the Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda. 153 The Pakistani
Taliban are likely far more focused on "concerns closer to home" than are al Qaeda's senior leaders who long for a restored Caliphate. 154 The only lasting solution to Pakistani sanctuary for al Qaeda is a comprehensive COIN effort. This requires a long-term "generational" investment in the region. The foremost concern is security; it is a precondition for all else in a COIN effort. 157 In other words, Talibanization must be contained with a firewall.
Part of that firewall is a broad-based educational reform that will counter the extreme messages of many of Pakistan's 10,000 madrassas. Pervez Hoodbhoy, a leading professor of nuclear physics at Islamabad's top university, laments, "It goes deeper than changing textbooks. It's a matter of changing society." 158 Additionally, the FATA must be politically incorporated into Pakistan if it is to be protected from Taliban militancy. Pulitzer-Prize winning journalist Steve Coll, a long-time observer of the region, asserts that the "only way al Qaeda can be marginalized … is to change the conditions in which they thrive by incorporating the tribal areas into a modernizing, successful Pakistani state." 159 This requires a multi-pronged strategy. First, the FCR must be reconsidered. While 72 percent of urban Pakistanis favor greater political inclusion for the FATA, there are those who reject the calls for greater incorporation (suggesting the tribesmen prefer their customary laws executed through the jirga system as opposed to the Pakistani system widely viewed as corrupt). 160 Local FATA political leaders must be empowered to determine their fate-the solution cannot be imposed from Islamabad. Any constitutional change for the FATA should be measured and gradual. Second, Pakistan must lift the ban on political parties.
This will allow opposing ideas to compete with the region's radical ideology. Third, the United
States and Pakistan should continually seek a political solution with the tribes, even the Taliban.
The United States "should pursue to separate those Islamist movements with local or national objectives from those that, like al Qaeda, seek to attack the United States or its allies directlyinstead of lumping them all together." 161 However, cooperation cannot be based on promises of future support. They must begin to turn over al Qaeda first.
Lastly, FATA operations must be coordinated with Afghan operations to minimize bleed off. Counterinsurgency theorist David Galula posits that "border areas are a permanent source of weakness for the counterinsurgent … By moving from one side of the border to the other, the insurgent is often able to escape pressure, or, at least, to complicate operations for his opponent." 162 democracy cannot survive the ever-expanding militant onslaught. To achieve these security objectives, the United States must employ a hybrid approach that incorporates elements of air policing, the Awakening, and classical COIN. The priority effort must be minimizing the immediate terrorist threat generated from the FATA, preferably in partnership with Pakistan but unilaterally if necessary. However, this near-term effort must be paired with a long-term COIN strategy that rolls back the Taliban and shrinks al Qaeda's operating space inside Pakistan.
Above all, the United States must recognize the depth of the challenge. Sir Winston Churchill wrote of the FATA in 1897 having spent six weeks there, "Every man's hand is against the other, and all against the stranger…. The state of continual tumult has produced a habit of mind which recks little of injuries, holds life cheap and embarks on war with careless levity." 163 Little has changed in the century since these words were written; yet, it is here that the United States must fight al Qaeda. This is the central front.
